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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DONAL FERRIN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 8571

vs
CLYDE W. FERRIN,
Defendant and Appellant

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent
STATEMENT
This action was brought by the plaintiff in the
lower court for the purpose of dissolution of a
partnership at will and for an accounting and damages
for alleged wrongful termination of said partnership
by defendant in the lower court who appealed from the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

decree of the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, one of th~
District Judges, of the District Court of the ·second
Judicial District in and for the County of Weber, State
of Utah.
Respondent alleged that a partnership at will was
entered into between h~m and appellant, known as
the Ogden Alfalfa Mills, on or about January 1st,
1948. This was admitted by appellant in his Answer
to Respondent's Complaint, Paragraph 1 and Paragraph
3, and in his Counterclaim Paragraph 2~ Also, upon
his direct examination shown at Page 105 of the Transcript, Line 20, further Page 113, Line 7, and Page 114,
Line 1. Respondent further alleged in his Complaint
that the sum of $39,500.00 was paid to the previous
owner Mr. Hawks out of income realized from the operation of said partnership, as noted in respondent's Exhibit "A", to which defendant did not object, and which
fact defendant admitted in his Answer, Paragraph 2,
in his Counterclaim, Paragraph 3, and by stipulation
through defendant's attorney Tr. P. 4, L. 23.
Plaintiff below then alleged that on or about the
20th day of April, 1955, defendant below attempted to
dissolve the partnership at will, by opening an account
in defendant's personal name rather than that of the
partnership, with partnership funds. Defendant below
admitted that on or about the 30th day of April, 1955
a separate bank account was opened, in which plaintiff
was not a part, Tr. P. 6, L. 13-24. This was admitted
in Paragraph 5 of defendant's Answer, Paragraph 8 of
his Counterclaim, and upon his direct examination, Tr.
P. 109, L. 14-17, where in response to the question of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attorney, Judge John A. Hendricks, Esq.,:

"Q. What did you finally tell

him~

A. I finally told him, my wife and I, we just decided to take the business over.

Q. And he was out of

it~

A. Yes."
Plaintiff recalls that these 'events took place on or
about April 30th, 1955, as the record so shows.
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant at the
time notified the plaintiff that he was taking the business over, had drawn the sum of approximately $3,000.00
in ·excess of that drawn by plaintiff. Reference to the
Tr. P. 121, L. 1-18 shows that defendant had drawn
$31,381.00 and the plaintiff had withdrawn $27,829.69.
Defendent Counterclaimed and admitted the partnership,
claimed about $9,000.00 beginning inventory and an
additional investment of $965.00, Counterclaim Paragraph 4, Tr. P. 192, L. 18-30, Tr. P. 193, L. 1-7 claimed
further that plaintiff and defendant had agreed that
defendant should receive $50.00 per month for overtime and management of their business, together with
$30.00 a month extra for bagging, and alleged that
plaintiff violated that partnership agreement by refusing
to bag, refusing to acquaint himself with the details of the business, grinding, marketing or soliciting,
and that he did absent himself from business for as
long as 30 days at a time, and refused to cooperate in
purchasing new equipment, etc, all of which defendant
failed to prove at the time of trial. (Italics ours)
3
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May it be noted at this time from Pages 1 to 11, is
information in the file on this matter and improperly
set forth in appellant's brief. From pages 12 through
20 is a mixture of fact and naration, most of which is
not supported by the transcript of proceedings in the
lower court, and is improperly set forth in appellant's
brief. From page 21 through 32 and the first paragraph
on page 33 is repetitious, appears in the file of
this cause, and improperly set forth in said brief, and
should be disregarded.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Evidence is sufficient to support Findings of
Fact.
II. The Court did not err m denying defendant's
motion for a new trial.
III. The Court did not err in appointing as attorney
for receiver one whose firm was attorney for intervenors and attorney for finn in civil action filed against
the defendant and Ogden Alfalfa :\Iills.
IV. The Court did not err in refusing to let defendant question plaintiff as to his solvency.
V. The Court did not err in not ordering the discharge of receiver upon the defendant filing a supersedeas bond.
VI. The Court did not err in not decreeing that
partnership existing between the defendant and plaintiff, terminated April 30, 1955.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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ARGUMENT
May it be noted that the first part of appellant's
argument is a statement unsubstantiated by the transcript and improperly included in said brief. With respect to the $700.00 and $800.00 items, the Court will
note in the transcript that the business paid the income
tax for each of the partners and their accounts were
credited with such being withdrawals. Certainly then,
a refund should go to each of the parties to whom such
a refund was entitled. It will further be noted with
respect to the gas charges against the company by
plaintiff, that once again the record will show, that
both plaintiff and defendant were charging gas against
the partnership account, and such was credited against
each partners withdrawals. The tractor upon which
defendant complained was also charged against plaintiff's withdrawals from the partnership business. Further it will be noted there is no testimony in the transcript, no allegation in any of defendant's pleadings,
that there was any false entries furnished by plaintiff.
Such was not complained of in defendant's counterclaim,
and was not complained of until set forth in the appeal
filed by defendant, and once again is improperly
entered in said brief. It should further be noted that
the brief sets forth certain attempts for reconciliation
after the complaint was filed. Once again this is improper material for said brief as was the constant referproper material as was the constant reference to the
Bunker-Tanner audit. Their record shows that defendant refused to go over any records other than
5
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his own. And it was concluded by all parties, that
there was no possibility of reconciliation between the
two partners.
POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
As to that portion of the Court Finding No. I,
which says
"April 30th, 1955, on which said date defendant
wrongfully and without cause expelled plaintiff from
such partnership business."
Plaintiff calls this Honorable Court's attention to
Tr. P. 6, L. 11-28, Tr. P. 7, L. 1-20, setting forth testimony to the effect that defendant wrongfully attempted
to terminate the partnership business on April 30, 1955,
contrary to law. This was further brought forth in his
cross-examination, Tr. P. 58, L. 18-21, where defendant
merely notified plaintiff that defendant and wife were
taking business over. It was further shown and admitted that defendant closed out partnership bank account and put partnership monies in his and his wife's
private account without plaintiff's knowledge or consent.
Nowhere in the transcript did defendant nor any of defendant's witnesses prove that plaintiff took unreasonable time away from work, caused da1nage to the partnership business, or did any more than atten1pt to bring
his withdrawals up to that of defendant's. Defendant's
own witness George Ferrin admitted that the partnership business had not suffered as a result of plaintiff's actions. Tr. P. 54, L. 10-12.
The allegations in Paragraph 7 and 8 of the de6
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fendant's counterclaim were not proved by any evidence
whatsoever. Plaintiff testified that there were only
minor differences between the parties and that no two
people could get along perfectly.
Defendant himself did not allege in his testimony
any unreasonable time taken off by plaintiff. It was
brought out however, that defendant himself had made
a trip for a week to California, and had taken time
off for Church work during working hours.
As to defendant's wrongful attempt at dissolution,
we cite the following:
In 40 American Jurisprudence, Page 300, it is stated
as follows:
"In a proper case a Court of Equity may at
the instance of one partner, dissolve a partnership on the ground of the failure or refusal of
a co-partner to comply with the partnership
agreement or because such co-partner has repeatedly breached the partnership articles**.
While one partner may not be authorized by
reason of misconduct, gross neglect or breach of
the partnership duty by another partner to treat
the partnership where definite term as ended
and exclude such other partner from the business without a decree of dissolution, it is well
established that Court's of equity will intervene
and decree the dissolution of a partnership for
various acts done by one partner in disregard of
his duties toward his co-partners."
See also Title 48-1-27 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and 48-1-28, Subsection (d) with respect to the right of

7
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one :p8trtn.er to e4pel tb.e, ptlrer.
In Roberts vs. Maraner, 245 Pacific 2d, 927, an
O:regon ease, decided in 1952, the case reported the
evidence showed animosity and disputes between the
partners, however, in discussing the ~ituatio;n, with re~pect of the right of op.~ partner to terminate, the court
held as follow~ :
".A Court of equity will not decree dissolution of
a partnership because of temporary or trifling
disputes among the partners or fo:r a.nimo!'ities
between the partners whiqh dQes Jl{)t injl!dt11l~ly
affect the ~~rtnerslrip. *"

This is almost exactly in point with the case beiore
this Court wit4 respect to defendants grounds for attemvted termination.
It is f1;1rther CQnte:pd~d by plaintiff~ tht~tt any dissentio:Q or strai11ed relatio:n was OOl!~ed by defendant hilnself rather tha:n by ~y action o£ the plaintiff.
It was shown th~t pl~ipti{f had been uns-qec~~sfw in attempting to draw out a sum equal to that dfQ.Wll out by
defenda:ut, and was forced to ~gn a oh~ck to defendant,
which defen<;l~nt c&Ued ~xtra wages iit 19&q, before
defendant would pay one of the other br-other~ who was
hired to help the two J?a:ftners.
As to Finding No. 2, there is no question but what
the Court has the pow€r t0 a1nend a Finding of Fact
made by said Court when it is shown that said original
finding is incorrect. It should be noted also, that said
amendm·ent did not_ a:pd could n,ot affect in any way the
decree of tll.e lower ~Qu_rt .. ~her~ is f-u.:rther ample evide.ll.ce
8
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in the record for the Court to make this finding. Defendant admitted that he, his father and two brothers, other
than Donal, had leased the Ogden Alfalfa Mills from a
Mr. Hawks, that the old arrangement was terminated
December 31st, 1947, and the new business, the partnership between plaintiff and defendant began January 1st,
1948, that the defendant and plaintiff purchased this
from the Mr. Hawks, including the equipment and so
forth, belonging to :Mr. John Hawks.
As to Finding No. 3, there is ample evidence in the
transcript to bear out the rulings of the lower court.
Judge Cowley found that defendant was entitled to
credit as his original cash investment, the sum of
$3,804.29. This figure was testified to by the father
of plaintiff and defendant, A. M. Ferrin on his direct
testimony, Tr. P. 88, L. 3-14, where Mr. Ferrin stated that
Clyde had never objected to the accounting he had prepared at the termination of the old arrangement, December 31st, 1947. Clyde's share, at that time, was $3,804.29.
Defendant admitted that the figure used to set up the
new partnership was obtained from the original partnership in 1946 and 1947. Tr. P. 118, L. 1-9. The Court
allowed the additional $665.00 and $350.00 as set forth
in the Tr. P. 123 making a total cash investment of
$4,819.29. Defendant then claimed the sum of $5,000.00
for equipment furnished to the partnership. The Court
disallowed these items, cutting some down and disallowing others and found that defendant was entitled to the
sum of $1,180.71 for inventory at the beginning of the
partnership arrangement. Defendant's own testimony
shows that he claims $5,000.00 credit for a 11/2 ton
Ford truck, a Norcroft chopper and grinder, bale loader
9·
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all.d trailer. L.~t us refer

to each of these iterns specifi-

~a.lly.

Defendant recalled -plaintiff's witness A. M. Ferrin,
the father of plaintiff and defendant. In questioning
him concerning the bale 1oader, Mr. Ferrin testified
that the bale loader had been purchased out of the earnings of the first partnerBhip, prior to the o-ne in question.
That the sa:m:e was left o-n the premises for the benefit
of the new partnership. That the sam~ at no time belonged to Clyde, the defendant in this cau~. Mr. Ferrin
testified that t.bis w~s not listed on th~ old inventory
and they all decided that Cly~ and Donal. the
defenda-nt and plai.I).tiff, could have the same ·without
paying for it. This tb~n, is an improper claim of the
defe:p.d~nt a~ pa;rt of his begining inventory and right..
fully was disallowed. ~f. P. 181, L. 10-28, in~lusive.
With respect to the Ford Semi, the same was true
and defendant improperly claimed this as his own in
the beginning inventory. Once again it was given to
plaintiff and defendant at the beginning of the new
partnership. The same being true of the trailer. This
is set forth in cross-examination of Arthur M. Ferrin,
Tr. P. 183, L. 1-28. Defendant attempted to prove that
Mr. Arthur M. Ferrin submitted the beginning inventory of defendant to Mr. Wangsgaard, bookkeeper, but
was unsuccessful in doing so. l\Ir. Ferrin testified that
he had never seen nor talked with 1fr. W angsaard; that
h~ had no knowledge of where defendant obtained his
beginning inventory figure of $9,000.00. Reference to
the Transcript will ~how that def~ndant hilnself ad·
mitted that the truck belonged to Mr. Hawks and was

10
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part of tlte equipment on the property at the time it
purchased from him for the partnership. Tr. P. 151.
Once again an improper claim by defendant as a part
of his beginning inventory. The same is true with
respect to the trailer claimed by defendant. In his
cross~examination, he once again admitted that all but
$300.00 of the trailer was paid for by the old partnership,
and brought into the new. Tr. P. 152, L. 1-28. Defendant's own testimony, Tr. P. 149, shows that he sold
the bale loader for $100.00 to people in Corinne and
he does not know what happenled to the $100.00. Tr.
P.149.
The Court's Finding No. 3, is completely substantiated by evidence in the transcript, the only evidence
which could be considered in the decision of said Court.
As to Finding No. 5, the Court found there was no
agreement for defendant to receive extra money. Once
again this is substantiated in the transcript. Plaintiff's
testimony when cross examined, set forth this to be a
fact. Tr. P. 48, L. 23-30, Tr. P. 63, L. 22-29, and on
plaintiff's redirect examination, Tr. P. 75, L. 1-9. Arthur
M. Ferrin, plaintiff's witness, also testified to this, Tr.
P. 89, L. 24-29. Defendant's testimony was not consistent, stated that the first records he kept of overtime were begun in 1955, just shortly before this action
was filed, and seven years after partnership entered
into. Tr. P. 108, L. 10-20. He stated later that the
records were begun to be kept in August of 1954. Tr.
P. 191, L. 1-2. No such records were offered by defendant. This surely indicates that defendant did not prior
to this time have any definite agreement with plain11
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tiff as to :extra money for overtime and bagging or
management of the business.
Under our Code, where there is no express agreement for the same, neither of the partners may claim
extra monies for doing extra work. Title 48-1-15, Subsection 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which states as
follows:
"No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business except that a
surviving partner is entitled to a reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the
partnership affairs."
This Honorable Court, in Keller vs. Wixom, 255
Pac. 2d, 118, decided in 1953, ruled that defendant was
properly refused the opportunity to introduce evidence
in support of his claim for extra compensation and
held as follows:
"That both partners rendered labor and services
in the furtherance of the partnership venture,
but that the appellant contributed more in this
respect than did the respondent; that at the
trial, defendant proffered evidence of his greater
exertion, but the Court sustained objection to
such offer on the grounds that as a n1atter of
law, partners receive no cmnpensation for action
in partnership business (other than splitting the
profits) unless there was an express agreement
or a provision for such ren1uneration."
The Court further stated:
" • * *'Amount of compensation 'either party in a

12
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partnership or joint venture is entitled to receive in the absence of a contract otherwise is
dependant upon the profits made from such joint
venture. We conclude no error arose in the exclusion of defendants profer of proof.' "
In the same vein, a California case, decided 1953,
Bange! vs. Bange!, 254 Pac. 2d, 919-929, the Court held
as follows:
"The general rule is that in the absence of an
express or implied agreement, a partner is not
entitled to any compensation for his services to
the partnership other than his share of the
profit * *. The fact that one partner contributes
greater skill and takes over the management of
the business does not give rise to right to extra
compensation without an agreement therefor."
These cases are exactly in point and govern this
eause.
As to Finding No. 6, there was absolutely no testimony in the transcript or any other proceeding in this
cause, showing that plaintiff took an unreasonable time
off of business during the seven and one-third years
that the parties were together in the partnership venture. Defendant claims that plaintiff took as much as
30 days at a time off, but off,ered no proof whatsoever
of this. As it amounte.d in the end, there is some testimony to the effect that plaintiff did take weekends off
and apparently took one trip to Colorado. It is also
testimony in the transcript to the 'effect that defendant
himself took time off for doing church work, and also

13
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a vacation in California. With respect to plaintiff's
refusal to do bagging, a reference to the transcript will
show that plaintiff offered to bag, if defendant would
do part of the delivering. Defendant refused to do
this. This is shown in the transcript P. 74, L. 8-17. There
is no evidence in the record that plaintiff wrongfully
refused to bag, and no evidence in the record to the
effect that plaintiff did not work in excess of 8 hours.
Apparently the agreement between the partners actually
was that defendant should do the bagging and plaintiff
should do the delivering. Once again this is shown by
Tr. P. 74, L. 8-16.
As to Finding No. 7, there is no evidence whatsoever in the transcript to show that plaintiff refused to
acquaint himself with the details of the business; that
plaintiff took unreasonable time off from business; that
plaintiff delayed the work prejudicially, or that plaintiff
became arrogant and refused to cooperate in the running of the business Nowhere in the transcript are
these facts proved or evidence even offered.
As to Finding No. 8, there is ample testimony to
support this finding in the transcript, and none contrary.
Defendant admitted in paragraph nu1nber 5 of his answer
that he opened a new banking account in which the
signature of plaintiff was not necessary for the cashing
of checks. His testiinony at the ti1ne of trial was that the
new account was put in the na1nes of himself and his
wife personally. Plaintiff at no time consented or
authorized transferring of partnership account into that
of defendant and his wife.
The transcript reveals that the defendant wrong-

14
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fully expelled plaintiff from partnership business as set
forth heretofore in this brief.
Defendant did not show reasonable grounds or
any cause whatsoever for a proper termination of the
partnership agreement.
As to Finding No 9, the transcript shows that numerous attempts were made by plaintiff to even the
account of the monies withdrawn by plaintiff and defendant, and his unsuccessful result of such attempts.
Also, he was forced to sign an extra check to def'endant
in order to see that his brother John was paid for working for the partnership. Tr. P. 8, L. 1-15.
As to Finding No. 10, the same is substantiated without contradiction by the transcript where plaintiff testified that at no time did he authorize the audit made by
the firm of Bunker & Tanner, as he knew that defendant
would submit his own figures rather than the figures
of both plaintiff and defendant. The audit did not show
the true condition of the business and was submitted by
defendant throughout the trial in his attempt to explain
certain figures and disallow other figures of his claims.
As to Finding No. 11, it was agreed by counsel for
defendant and counsel for plaintiff that the sum of
$35,000.00 would be used as a value of said partnership
business. The stipulation was entered into and made by
counsel for defendant, Tr. P. 1 and 2. It was further
stipulated by both counsels that the withdrawals were
the sum of $31,381.00 for the defendant and $27,829.69
for plaintiff. Tr. P. 121, L. 1-18.
As to Finding No. 12, a reference to the order made
15
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by the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, one of the Judges
of the Second Judicial District Court, dated November
22nd, 1955 will show that defendant was adjudged to
be in contempt of court and there is no subsequent testimony showing that defendant cleared himself of such
contempt.
Finding No. 13 is the only finding the Court could
make in this cause, where defendant had attempted to
terminate the partnership business wrongfully. Actually,
under the laws of the State of Utah, Title 48-1-34 Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the statute states that the partner
not wrongfully dissolving the partnership has the right
to wind up the partnership affairs. As to the appointment of the receiver, in a recent case, Seibert et al, vs.
Shaver, 247 Pac. 2d, 609 (1952) by the District Court of
Appeals, Second District, Division Two, California, it
was held as follows :
"The appointment of a receiver is confided to
the discretion of the trial court * * * and the
order will not be reversed in the absence of clear
showing of an abuse of discretion. * * * It was
not error to appoint a receiver 1nerely because
plaintiff possessed other ren1edies which would
have afforded mnple protection * * *. Where it
appears that there is danger of 1nisappropriation
of the propery of the partnership, and the evidence conflicting as to the likelihood of loss, the
reviewing court is in no position to say that the
court below has abused its discretion * * *."
Such appointment is proper to carry the judgment

16
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into effect to preserve the property during the pendency
of the appeal.
In the instant ease before this Court, plaintiff has
submitted t·estimony to the effect that defendant has
failed and intentionally refused to provide the books
and records of the partnership since the 31st day of
May, 1955, and has conspired to destroy certain records
to prevent plaintiff from using them against defendant.
Further, the partnership account was in defendant~s
name alone, and under no control of plaintiff. There
seenis to be no contrary cases coneerning the right of
the lower court to appoint a receiver, pending appeal.
See Clark on Receivers, Volume 1, 2nd :EJdition,
Page 187, et. seq.

POINT II
The Court did not err in denying defendant's motion
for a new trial.
From the review of Point No. 1, concerning the
Findings of Fact, as found by the Honorable Charles
G. Cowley, in the lower court, it is clear there was ample
evidence, and inde·ed in most instances, the only evidence in the transcript upon which to base his
findings and decree. The Court rightfully found defendant was not entitled to a new trial, no error having
been shown.

POINT III
The Court did not err in appointing as attorney for
receiver one whose firm was attorney for intervenor
and attorney for firm in civil action against defendant

11
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and Ogden Alfalfa Mills.
From the examination of the file, it will be noted
that the First Security Bank of Utah, Ogden Branch,
was appointed receiver in this matter. It will be noted
further, that the civil action referred to in appellant's
point number 3, was where the father Arthur 1\I.
Ferrin brought an action to determine his claim against
the Ogden Alfalfa Mills. It was as much an action
against plaintiff as it was against the defendant.
Plaintiff has not objected to this action, realizing
that it was stipulated that 11r. Arthur ~1. Ferrin has a
judgment against the partnership. The matter has been
concluded, and the receiver and attorney for the
receiver are acting as agents of this lower court,
and under the Court's strict supervision.
Plaintiff has never questioned the honesty or integrity of
First Security Bank, nor of its counsel, and there has
been no showing of prejudice or injury resulting from
such appointment.
POINT IV
The Court did not err in refusing to let defendant
question plaintiff as to his solvency.
Again, in reference to defendant's Answer and
Counterclaim, and all proceedings prior to the date of
trial, there was never any hint of the insolvency of the
plaintiff, and there has been no question as to his solvency as to this date. The Court rightfully denied defendant the right to question plaintiff as to the solvency,
the same not being an issue nor being material to the
cause in question.

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT V
The Court did not err in refusing to order the discharge of receiver upon the defendant's filing a supersedas bond.
As a matter of law, it is well understood that the
filing of a supersedeas bond is provided for to stay
the execution of the lower courts decree, pending appeal.
Rule 73(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953.
It should be further noted, with respect to the
appointment of a receiver, that defendant had continualy refused to obey the orders of the lower court, especially those of the Honorable Parley E. Norseth. That
defendant had been adjudicated in contempt of court
for his failure to obey said order, and the defendant has
continually refused to pay plaintiff as ordered by said
court. Under the circumstances, the court has the
authority, which is discretionary, to appoint said re~eiver and for the purpose of protecting plaintiff's
interests in this cause, continne the use of said
receiver until this matter is dispo~ed of and terminated.

POINT VI
The court did not err in not decre'eing that the
partnership existing between the def~ndant and plaintiff terminated April 30th, 1955. Defendant failed in
the trial in the lower court to prov~ any legally Sllf,.
ficient grounds for his attempt at dissolution of the
partnership. As a matter of fact, a reference to the
Transcript and proceedings shows clearly that defend,..
ant breached the partnership agreement, and violated
the partnership laws of the Stat~ of Ut.ah, in that he
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refused to render an accounting to plaintiff, to permit
plaintiff to equal defendant's withdrawals from the
partnership business, refused to do the delivering at
plaintiff's request, evicting plaintiff from partnership,
and wrongfully closed out the partnership account and
placed an account in his own name and that of his wife,
all of which is contrary to the laws of the State of
Utah, with respect to the partnership relation. Under
Title 48-1-29, the statute is as follows:
"Dissolution by decree of Court. {1) On application by or for a partner, the Court shall decree
a dissolution whenever: * (c) A partner has been
guilty of such conduct as tends to effect prejudicially the carrying on of the business. * (d)
A partner wilfully or persistently commits a
breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to
the partnership business, it is not reasonably
practical to carry on the business in partnership
with him." (Italics ours)
CONCLUSION
To support the findings and decree of the lower
court, plaintiff and respondent has referred continually
to the transcript and the pleadings and orders on file
therein, which defendant and appellant has not. Judge
Cowley was the trier of the facts to apply the law to
said facts. There is ample eYidence shown to support
the lower court in all its findings and decree, and there
is shown a correct application of the law to those findings of fact. It is well understood that where the
Judge is the trier of the fact, his findings will not be
modified if there is evidence in the proceedings which
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will support said findings. The Judge was in the position to listen to the parties, observe their demeanor,
willingness to answer the questions, and sincerety.
The lower court rightfully found that defendant
wrongfully attempted to dissolve the partnership relations between plaintiff and defendant, and that plaintiff did not violate the partnership relations in any way.
The Court then correctly applied the law, governing partnerships of the State of Utah, and decreed that
the plaintiff was entitled for a decree of dissolution to
be determined by the Court.
Under competent 'evidence, the Court properly found
as to defendants beginning inventory, cash and equipment in sum of $6,000.00, and under Title 48-1-15 ( 4),
correctly decreed that defendant was not entitled to interest on his capital investment. The Court further decreed that a receiver should be appointed to manage the
business and to arrange for the sale, setting forth the
terms of settlement to each of the partners. Under
48-1-29 through 48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the
Court correctly decreed that the partnership business be
disposed of and an accounting be made between the
partners and payment made from the proceeds of sale.
It is clear that there is no error on the part of the
lower court, in the trial nor in the proceedings had prior
to said trial.
There is no ground for a new trial, and the order
of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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